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SELF-REGULATION OF INSIDER-TRADING
IN MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS
Tamar Frankel *
INTRODUCTION
Financial services providers such as investment advisers, investment
managers, underwriters, and brokers produce or possess financial insiderinformation. Insider-information is inherent in their very services for a
number of reasons. First, as part of their work financial services providers
should glean as much information as they can about target investments,
including nonpublic information. Second, financial servicers create a
temporary or lasting effect on securities market prices by offering
investment advice to a large number of followers or to large clients. Third,
the performances of some financial servicers, such as mutual funds
management and investment advice, may affect the securities prices
markets in which they determine to trade or guarantee for their clients or for
their institutions’ trading. After all, at the end of 2012, mutual funds alone
held over $26 trillion in worldwide assets. 1
Thus, by definition, financial servicers either gain nonpublic
information or create it. In fact, financial servicers are similar to legislators.
Legislators, too, receive insider-information and may make decisions that
enhance or reduce the profitability of enterprises and, consequently, the
price of the enterprises’ securities. 2
It is not surprising that financial servicers and their personnel must
grapple with a strong and continuous temptation to use insider-information
for their own benefit or for the benefit of selected others, such as family
members or friends. In contrast, the law that prohibits insider-trading often
remains unenforced. The reason is that outside regulators face great
difficulty and high costs in detecting and preventing the use of insiderinformation by those related to financial servicers’ institutions. Therefore,
the legal prohibition on insider trading is enforced after the fact or remains
a dead letter. A legal prohibition in and by itself might deter violations. But
in this case the prohibition is not very effective. The possibility of quick
collections of large sums of money and the low risk of discovery may trump
the prohibition.
And yet, throughout the years, there have been relatively few cases
concerning insider-trading by regulated mutual funds and advisory service
personnel. From 1980 to 2012, according to a LEXIS search, the U.S.
* Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
1. See INV. CO . INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMP ANY FACT BOOK 25 (53d ed. 2013), available

at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.
2. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2011).
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed thirty-one enforcement
actions under Rule 17j-1 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 3
Significantly, the most recent proceedings are dated from 2007,4 and none
were found for the past five years before that date. Eight of the thirty-one
proceedings involved violations of the substantive provision of Rule 17j-1,
that is, the direct prohibition on certain fraudulent activities. 5 Twelve of the
proceedings involved violations of the individual companies’ established
codes of ethics (Codes of Ethics or Codes) requirements,6 including one
case in which performing transactions in violation of a Code was deemed
aiding and abetting a violation of the Code requirements. 7 There was one
insider-trading case against an investment company in 1990,8 one against
an investment adviser and a portfolio manager in 1995,9 and another against
an investment adviser in 1997. 10
In 2012 the SEC alleged that a consulting firm and its manager obtained
material nonpublic information and provided it to clients, who were
“portfolio managers and analysts at prominent hedge funds and other
nationally recognized investment advisors.” 11 In 2011 the SEC claimed that
an employee’s trades followed the trades at his former employer’s
exchange-traded fund (ETF) desk. 12 When the SEC focused on insidertrading in the last four years, regulated mutual funds and their managers and
employees took a back seat to corporations, hedge funds, investment banks,
bank managers, and their employees. 13

3. Result of LEXIS search performed Feb. 1, 2013, in “ SEC Decisions, Orders & Releases.”
4. Brod, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2673, Investment Company Act Release No.
28,022, 91 SEC Docket 2377 (Oct. 24, 2007).
5. E.g., id.; Buchner, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2282, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,580, 83 SEC Docket 1961 (Aug. 26, 2004); Speaker, Investment Company Act
Release No. 22,461, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1605, Exchange Act Release No.
38,161, 63 SEC Docket 1640 (Jan. 13, 1997).
6. E.g., Van Wagoner, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2281, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,579, 83 SEC Docket 1955 (Aug. 26, 2004); Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2192, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,255, 81 SEC Docket
1913 (Nov. 13, 2003); Gintel Asset Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2079,
Investment Company Act Release No. 25,798, Exchange Act Release No. 46,798, 2002 WL
31499839 (Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Gintel Release].
7. Gintel Release, supra note 6.
8. SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990).
9. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1494, Investment
Company Act Release No. 21,113, 59 SEC Docket 1103 (June 6, 1995).
10. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1630, 64 SEC Docket
1207 (Apr. 28, 1997).
11. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Kinnucan, No. 12-CV-1230 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp22261.pdf.
12. Mindlin, Securities Act Release No. 9261, Exchange Act Release No. 65,372, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3284, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,813, 101 SEC Docket
3911 (Sept. 21, 2011).
13. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, SEC, http://www.sec.gov
/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 25, 2013) (summarizing enforcement
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Mutual funds are required to impose Codes of Ethics on many of their
employees. Did this requirement make a difference? After all, similar Codes
proliferate in many other financial and business corporations 14 with fairly
miserable results. In fact, the temptations facing employees and managers
of many business corporations that published self-imposed Codes are
relatively weaker than the temptations facing employees and managers of
mutual funds. Yet as compared to mutual funds, these business companies
have failed to prevent insider-trading!
I believe that regulated mutual funds are less prone to insider-trading
than non-regulated funds and traders because their Codes of Ethics have
introduced enforcement mechanisms and have influenced their culture.
Regulated mutual funds’ Codes of Ethics are accompanied by four features
that may have helped reduce the zeal of temptation for insider-trading:
(1) The Codes are far from voluntary. They are required by law.
(2) The Codes contain both general principles and self-enforcement
mechanisms.
(3) Mutual funds depend not only on their performance but, like other
financial services, are heavily dependent on investors’ trust. The
managers of regulated mutual funds recognize that a hint of unfair
treatment can decimate their entire business and may result in
“runs.” Similar to banks, open-end funds must offer investors
redemption within seven days of demand, with few exceptions. 15
Mutual funds receive investors’ demands, and in seven days
investors must receive their money! 16
(4) The Investment Company Institute—the professional and trade
organization of investment advisers that manage mutual funds—has
supported the legally required provisions of the Code.
It may well be that these four conditions help increase the deterrent effect,
reduce temptation within an organization, strengthen the prohibition on
insider-trading, and—most importantly—establish a culture of compliance.

actions relating to hedge funds and similar organizations, rather than mutual funds, from late 2009
to present).
14. See, e.g., DELOITTE DEVELOP MENT LLC, CODE OF ETHICS & P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(2013),
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets
/Documents/us_about_ei_coe2013_06042013.pdf (accounting firm); U.S. BANK , CODE OF ETHICS
BUSINESS CONDUCT (2013), available at https://usbank.com/hr/docs/policies
AND
/coeHandbook.pdf (bank); W HIRLP OOL CORP ., CODE OF ETHICS (2006) available at
http://www.whirlpoolcorp.com/shared/content/responsibility/code-of-ethics.pdf (manufacturing
firm).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012) (general rule); 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.22e-1 to -3 (2013)
(exceptions).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e).
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This Article concludes with two questions. First: what is not included in
the Code of Ethics? And second: does it pay to internalize enforcement, and
if so, to whom? The following is a discussion of each of these four
components.
I. THE CODES OF ETHICS IMPOSED ON MUTUAL FUNDS
HAVE BEEN INDUCED AND SUPPORTED BY LAW
A. INVES TMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 17 (RULE 17 J-1) 18
Rule 17j-1 requires investment companies to establish Codes of
Ethics. 19 The Rule’s requirement applies both to the investment company’s
investment adviser and principal underwriter. 20 The principal underwriter is
very important to open-end investment companies because these companies
issue redeemable securities. 21 Investors may demand their money, not
because they are dissatisfied with the performance of their funds but
because they need the money. 22 Yet, heavy demand may shrink the fund’s
portfolio and raise the cost of managing it. 23 The dependency of mutual
funds on principal underwriters is the main reason for regulating their
Codes of Ethics. 24
B. RULE 17 J-1 PROVIDES DETAILED REQUIREMENTS REGARDING
THE SUBS TANCE OF CODES OF ETHICS
Codes must contain specific self-enforcing provisions. These provisions
must be implemented not only to punish violators but to prevent violations
of the federal securities laws. The requirements include oversight of
compliance by the investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator,
and transfer agent. 25 Under Rule 38a-1, the funds’ boards of directors are
required to approve the policies and procedures—the Codes—of the
Id. §§ 80a-1 to -64.
17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1.
Id.
Id. § 270.17j-1(c)(1)(i).
2 T AMAR FRANKEL & ANN T AYLOR SCHWING , T HE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS
§ 9.03[D], at 9-56 (2002) (noting investment companies’ dependence on distribution of their
securities); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(b) (requiring principal underwriter for registered open-end
investment company to have written contract).
22. See Mutual Fund Redemption Fees, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,782, 70 Fed.
Reg. 13,328, 13,328 (Mar. 18, 2005) (noting that mutual funds’ “ redemption right makes funds
attractive to fund investors, most of whom are long-term investors, because it provides ready
access to their money if they should need it”).
23. See, e.g., Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1990) (“ [A]n
enormous and rapid shrinkage in asset size is potentially very damaging . . . . Lower total assets
would also result in a higher effective advisory charge to remaining shareholders because of the
economies of scale of fund management.”).
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(1).

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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investment adviser, principal underwriter, administrator, and transfer
agent. 26 A few details are interesting:
1. The Code must subject “access persons” to reporting of their
personal securities transactions and holdings. 27 An access person is a
“supervised person who has access to nonpublic information regarding
clients’ purchase or sale of securities, is involved in making securities
recommendations to clients or who has access to such recommendations
that are nonpublic.” 28 “A supervised person who has access to nonpublic
information regarding the portfolio holdings of affiliated mutual funds” is
an access person as well. 29
Thus, access persons include “portfolio management personnel and, in
some organizations, client service representatives who communicate
investment advice to clients” (even if they did not prepare the advice). 30
“These employees [gain] information about investment recommendations
whose effect may not yet be felt in the marketplace; [therefore], they
may be in a position to take advantage of their inside knowledge.” 31
“Administrative, technical, and clerical personnel may also be access
persons if their functions or duties [require] access to nonpublicinformation.” 32
There is no specific and fixed definition of the word “access” with
respect to insider-information. Access is measured by the organizations’
controls and structures. 33 If an organization has a large number of
employees with broad responsibilities, yet imposes on them few barriers to
insider-information, the organization may have to consider a larger percentage
of its staff to be access persons. 34 In contrast, if an organization keeps strict
controls on sensitive information, it may be deemed to have fewer access
persons. 35 Thus, the position of the employees is not the only consideration.
The internal controls of the organization play a part in the definition of
“access” as well. Rule 204A-1 provides a “presumption that, if the firm’s
primary business is providing investment advice, then all of its directors,
officers and partners will also be access persons.” 36 Therefore, in many
26. Id.
27. Id. § 270.17j-1(d).
28. Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2256,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,492, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,698 (July 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release].
29. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(a)(1) (general definition); id. § 270.17j-1(a)(1)(i)
(incorporating definition of “ Advisory Person of a Fund or of a Fund’s investment adviser”); id.
§ 270.17j-1(a)(2) (defining “ Advisory Person of a Fund or of a Fund’s investment adviser”).
30. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. (noting relationship between access and information barriers or controls).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(e)(1)(ii)).
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advisory firms, directors, officers, and partners will be access persons as
well.
2. The Code should impose on an adviser’s access persons a
requirement to periodically report their personal securities transactions and
holdings. 37
The report should be forwarded to the adviser’s chief compliance
officer or other designated persons. 38 The adviser should review the reports
to ensure that the adviser and the SEC examiner would be able to “identify
improper trades or patterns of trading by access persons.” 39 The reports are
modeled largely on the requirements in Rule 17j-1. 40
3. Even though Rule 17j-1 contains no requirement to adopt many of
the detailed, prophylactic measures common to many Codes, advisory firms
usually include in their Codes many of the following elements:
a. Access persons must have prior written approval (or “preclearance”) before they can place a personal securities transaction and may
trade in securities only through particular brokers. These persons could be
limited with respect to the number of brokerage accounts they may hold. 41
b. Advisers s hould pr e pa r e “duplicate trade confirmations
and account statements” and set forth procedures for assigning new
securities analyses to employees. These employees’ personal holdings
should not present apparent conflicts of interest. 42
c. An advisory firm should maintain lists of the issuers of
securities that the Advisory firm is analyzing or recommending for clients.
Advisers are prohibited from “personal trading in securities of those
issuers.” 43 In addition, the firm must maintain “‘restricted lists’ of issuers
Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698.
Id.
Id.
Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(d).
Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698; I NV. CO . I NST.,
REP ORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL I NVESTING , at vii, 14–15, app. II at 4 (1994)
[hereinafter REP ORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL I NVESTING ], available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_personal_investing.pdf.
42. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698; REP ORT OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL I NVESTING , supra note 41, at vii, 45.
43. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698; REP ORT OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL I NVESTING , supra note 41, app. II at 4; FRANKEL & SCHWING ,
supra note 21, § 13.04, at 13-64 (citing I NV. ADVISER ASS’ N , STANDARDS OF P RACTICE (2010),
available
at
https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/Reports_and
_Brochures/IAA_Standards_of_Practice/Standards_of_Practice_2010_final.pdf (“ The parameters
of an investment adviser’s duty depend on the scope of the advisory relationship and generally
include . . . the duty to respect the confidentiality of client information.”)); CFA I NST., CODE OF
ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT para. III.E.1–3 (2010), available at
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2010.n14.1 (“ Members and Candidates must keep
information about current, former, and prospective clients confidential unless: (1) T he information
concerns illegal activities on the part of the client or prospective client, (2) Disclosure is required
by law, or (3) T he client or prospective client permits disclosure of the information.”); Code of
Ethics & Professional Responsibility, CERTIFIED FIN . P LANNER BOARD OF STANDARDS,

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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about which the Advisory firm has inside information, and prohibitions on
any trading (personal or for clients) in securities of those issuers.” 44 The
firm should impose “‘blackout periods’ when client securities trades are
being placed” or recommended. Access persons may not personally engage
in transactions in these securities. 45
d. Access persons must be reminded that investment
opportunities should be offered to clients first, before the adviser or its
employees may act on such opportunities. 46 The Adviser must have
procedures to implement this directive. 47
4. The Code should prohibit “‘short-swing’ trading and market
timing.” 48
5. The Code should require initial and annual holdings and quarterly
transaction reports,49 with three exceptions: “transactions effected pursuant
to an automatic investment plan,” 50 “securities held in accounts over which
the access person had no direct or indirect influence or control,” 51 and a
report that would “duplicate information contained in [broker] trade
confirmations or account statements” provided that recordkeeping

http://www.cfp.net/for-cfp-professionals/professional-standards-enforcement/standards-ofprofessional-conduct/code-of-ethics-professional-responsibility (last visited Nov. 17, 2013)
(“ Protect the confidentiality of all client information. Confidentiality means ensuring that
information is accessible only to those authorized to have access. A relationship of trust and
confidence with the client can only be built upon the understanding that the client’s information
will remain confidential.”); Code of Ethics, FIN . P LANNING ASS’ N , http://www.fpanet.org
/AboutFPA/CodeofEthics/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (“ An FPA member shall not disclose any
confidential client information without the specific consent of the client unless in response to
proper legal process, to defend against charges of wrongdoing by the FPA member or in
connection with a civil dispute between the FPA member and client.”); see FINRA Manual:
Contents,
FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element
_id=8849 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (FINRA Rule 2060, which has superseded NASD Rule
3120); cf. W. E. SELL , AGENCY § 136, at 123 (1975) (“ An agent has a duty not to reveal or use
any confidential information received from his principal for his own or another’s benefit.” T he
term “ confidential information” has been construed to include all information that the agent
should be aware the principal would not want revealed, for example, a list of preferred customers
or a manufacturing process. “ Confidential information” does not include generally known
information.); John Howat & Linda Reid, Compensation Practices for Retail Sale of Mutual
Funds: The Need for Transparency and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP . & FIN . L. 685 (2007).
44. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698.
45. Id.; see also REP ORT ON THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL INVESTING , supra note 41,
at 36.
46. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,698.
47. Id.; see also REP ORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL INVESTING , supra note 41,
at 27 (stating principle that client interests should come first).
48. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28; see also INV. CO . INST., supra
note 41, at vii.
49. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28; 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A1(b)(1)(ii)(A)–(B), (2) (2013).
50. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(b)(3)(ii).
51. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(b)(3)(i).
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requirements are met. 52 There is an additional exception if the advisory firm
“has only one access person, so long as the firm maintains records of the
holdings and transactions that Rule 204A-1 would otherwise require be
reported.” 53
6. The Code “must require that access persons obtain the adviser’s
approval before investing in an initial public offering (‘IPO’) or private
placement.” 54 This issue is debated. Because “[m]ost individuals rarely have
the opportunity to invest in these types of securities[,] an access person’s
IPO or private placement purchase raises issues.” 55 To what extent does the
employee “misappropriat[e] an investment opportunity that should first be
offered to eligible clients”? 56 Or is a portfolio manager “receiving a personal
benefit for directing client business or brokerage”? 57 Yet it seems that these
actions should generally be prohibited. One signal is Rule 204A-1’s
exception for advisory firms with only one access person. 58
C. THE CODES IMPOS E ENFORCEMENT M ECHANIS MS SUCH AS
REPORTING VIOLATIONS AND EDUCATING EMPLOYEES
“[E]ach adviser’s code of ethics must require prompt internal reporting
of any violations of the code. Violations must be reported to the adviser’s
chief compliance officer.” 59 Further, “an adviser’s code of ethics must
require the adviser to provide each supervised person with a copy of the
code of ethics and any amendments.” 60 This requirement reduces the cost of
government examiners.
Nonetheless, a Code of Ethics differs from a statute or regulation by
offering more flexibility. Instead of requiring evidence in writing and a
review by independent experts, the Codes may offer, for example, to
include mechanisms that help the institutions enforce the Code rules. This
flexibility allows for adjusting the rules to fit the particular functions, size,
and culture of subject institutions. Advisers have more discretion to design
their Codes and facilitate enforcement of the rules.
52. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(b)(3)(iii).
53. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,699; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(d).
54. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700; see also REP ORT OF
THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL I NVESTING , supra note 41, at 32–34.
55. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 41,699; cf. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1(d) (exempting a company with a single access
person from the requirement of obtaining approval for investments in any security in an IPO or in
a limited offering).
59. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(a)(4).
60. Investment Advisers Code of Ethics Release, supra note 28, at 41,700; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.204A-1(a)(5).
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It is interesting that the SEC did not prohibit insiders within advisory
organizations from securities trading. 61 After all, such a requirement would
have made the issues and enforcement simpler. 62 Yet it was recognized that
a prohibition (like the prohibition on alcohol drinking) will be difficult, if
not impossible, to enforce. People who deal with securities trading and
management are engrossed in their activities. The assumption seems to have
been that a total prohibition might lead to increased avoidance and costlier
enforcement.
The sanctions for violating a Code of Ethics are crucial to its viability.
Employers must enforce the rules and punish its violations. The SEC backs
these sanctions with more severe ones, such as disqualification from
engaging ever again in the service or trade. 63 Rule 17j-1 requires
compliance procedures and practices to prevent Code violations. 64 These
requirements apply only to registered investment companies and their
advisers and principal underwriters. 65 Lawyers and compliance officers
play a role in enforcing the law. While legal provisions may disqualify
violators from continuing to practice,66 they rarely impose termination of
the violators’ employment. In contrast, private enforcement by employers
for violations of Codes of Ethics can involve reduced bonuses, demotion,
and termination of employment, among other disciplinary actions. Thus, to
this extent the employers’ enforcement power is not only vested in them but
provides more, alternative enforcement measures.
II. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN STRENGTHENING
THE LEGALLY REQUIRED PROVISIONS OF THE CODE
The requirement to establish a Code was negotiated with the Investment
Company Institute, and that led to an agreement before Congress. 67 The
61. See REP ORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL INVESTING , supra note 41, at 19–25
(discussing Advisory Group’s consideration of total ban on personal investing by portfolio
managers).
62. See id. at 20 (noting that such a ban may be a “ clear standard to follow” and “ relatively
easy to implement and administer and less burdensome and costly than the alternatives”).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(f) (2012).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c)(2)(i) (2013).
65. Id. (requiring “ Fund, investment adviser and principal underwriter” to institute procedures
to prevent violations of Code of Ethics); Id. § 270.17j-1(a)(5) (defining “ Fund” as “ an investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act”).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(b), 80b-3(f).
67. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 9510 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong.
73 n.27 (1967) (statement of the SEC); see id. at 80, 84–85 (T he SEC recommended changes to
provisions of Senate Bill 1659, reflecting upon how both SEC staff and representatives of the
Investment Company Institute had agreed “ that the purposes intended by the proposed amendment
would be more precisely delineated if the amendment prohibited insider trading in contravention
of such rules as the Commission may adopt to define fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative
practices and to prescribe means reasonably necessary to prevent such practices.” T he Investment
Company Institute agreed that SEC would be authorized “ to adopt rules with respect to minimum
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Code’s provisions are supported by private organizations. The Investment
Company Institute—the professional/trade organization of investment
advisers that manage mutual funds 68 —has established a Code which is
intended to prevent insider-trading and sets higher standards than the Code
required by regulations. 69 Similarly, the Investment Adviser Association
(the IAA) has established a Code prohibiting violations of general fiduciary
duties (e.g., conflicts of interest and non-disclosure). 70 Membership in the
IAA is not required, but membership requires endorsement of the
standards. 71
In sum, pressured by the public, the professional organizations,
combined with a shadow of SEC enforcement and specific internal
enforcement, may be able to increase the strength of enforcement by the
management and reduce government enforcement.
III. WHAT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CODE OF ETHICS?
Just as interesting as the contents of Codes of Ethics is what is not
included in the requirements concerning the Code. Open many books on
Codes of Ethics and you will find at the outset a discussion of ethics. 72 This
requirement is missing here. The word “Ethics” appears in the title of the
Code. Yet, there is no direct requirement to behave in an ethical way. This
is not, in my opinion, an error. It is intentional.
The reason may have been spelled out in another examination of
effective Codes of Ethics. The advice in that source is to avoid “positions
that are generally held in society” such as: “obey the law.” 73 A Code is also
a piece of literature. Its writing and expressions can be inspirational or
deadly boring. Therefore, avoidance of well-trodden words is desirable.
Highly generalized expressions do not lend help when applying the rules to
everyday, specific activities. Highly detailed rules are mind-numbing, but
also invite circumvention. Although precision can be understood, everyday
work involves activities that do not necessarily fall into the precise
standards for codes of ethics governing insider trading by insiders of investment companies to
prevent such practices, and the statute so specifies.”); Hearings on S. 1659 Before the S. Comm.
on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. (1967).
68. See REP ORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON P ERSONAL INVESTING , supra note 41, at 8
(noting industry support of adoption of section 17(j) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
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language of Codes of Ethics. Therefore, something in-between is most
desirable.
Have these materials decreased the prevalence of insider-trading? They
have not. Have I assumed that the rate of insider-trading by advisory firms
is related to their Codes of Ethics? I have not. Arguably, the reason for the
lower use of insider-trading is that employees in these organizations are
well rewarded. I reject this argument. People who deal with money are
usually hungry for money. For such people there is never enough. For
people who are envious of richer people, there are always those who have
more. 74 Therefore, the explanation must be different for people who deal
with money and make enormous returns for others but are not likely to use
the easier path to financial success by insider-trading.
Codes of Ethics contribute to the low incidence of insider-trading for a
number of reasons. In this Article I deal with just one contribution: culture.
Culture is a social habit. Our culture requires us to wear clothes in public. A
social habit is beneficial in that it leads to a “knee-jerk reaction” rather than
to an evaluation of the pros and cons of a particular action. 75 Every society
has leadership, from a family to a club, a school, or Congress. And in each
such group there is a leader or a group of leaders, from fathers (or fathers
and mothers) to teachers and party leaders. They are the ones who establish
or induce others to follow a certain group-culture.
In a business organization, the leadership is usually endowed with rank
signals to clarify and establish their position (although there are controlling
persons who bear no title). 76 To some extent, Codes of Ethics help leaders
in financial advisory services to establish a culture that prohibits insidertrading. It may be the culture that causes every access person to say: “We
do not do this here!” Such a culture finds many reasons to justify the
prohibition, such as the support of the law; the approval of the professional
and the leadership of business organizations; public reputation; trust,
loyalty, and devotion of investors and employees; significant profits; and
the satisfaction of controlling much money and affecting the social welfare.
If violations by insider-trading threaten the strength of all these factors, then
insider-trading is a danger to be prevented. And the best way to prevent it is
to make clear to the rank and file as well as co-management that such an
action will not be tolerated.
When these benefits to high-ranking leadership exist, there is a good
chance that insider-trading can be reigned-in, if not eradicated entirely. The
Codes of Ethics in the financial advisory area may demonstrate this.

74. T AMAR FRANKEL , T RUST AND HONESTY 88–91 (2005).
75. Id. at 190.
76. Id. at 193–94 (role of leaders in culture).
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CONCLUSION
As money managers serve more investors, pool more securities, and
combine their securities-pools with other pools, investors and outside
regulators are less able to uncover, let alone control, the activities of these
money managers. Many financial services can be carried out without
detection; many wrongful actions can be justified as good business
practices and efficient services. The danger to the financial system from
wrongful activities can be devastating. Societies cannot afford to wait until
the harm of such activities is done.
Codes of Ethics are focused on prevention rather than punishment.
Compliance Officers and top management can more easily detect possible
violations and uproot them. Effective compliance might be practiced within
the institutions in the shadow of the law. Mutual funds and advisers’ Codes
of Ethics and their enforcement offer one fairly effective model.

